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35Historical argument for regulatory failureIn 1967, Dr. Isabel Gal, a Surrey-based paediatrician,
suggested in a brief letter to Nature that hormonal
pregnancy tests (HPTs) might be causing spina bifida in the
children of mothers who had taken the drugs while pregnant
(Gal et al., 1967). Primodos, the first HPT, was launched in
1950 by the West German pharmaceutical company Schering
AG (today Bayer). It was marketed to doctors both as a
treatment for menstrual irregularities and as a convenient
test for early pregnancy. Like the other HPTs that followed,
Primodos functioned diagnostically by inducing menstrual-
like bleeding in non-pregnant women (a ‘negative’ result);
no bleeding implied pregnancy. In Britain, Schering took
Primodos off the market in 1978 amidst allegations that
HPTs caused miscarriage and a range of birth defects.1 At
around the same time, a group of parents formed the
Association for Children Damaged by Hormone Pregnancy
Tests (ACDHPT) to take civil action against Schering. The
action was discontinued in 1982 but on terms that left the
plaintiffs free to proceed again pending further evidence
that Primodos caused birth defects.
A few years ago, the discovery of previously inaccessible
archival records in London and Berlin revitalized the long-
dormant campaign. Led by patient-activist Marie Lyon, ACDHPT
is today supported by Gregory Abrams Davidson Solicitors
and an All-Party Parliamentary Group chaired by Labour MP
Yasmin Qureshi. To date, the archival evidence has been used
most effectively by investigative journalist Jason Farrell in
‘Primodos: the Secret Drug Scandal’, a Sky News documentary
that, when screened in Parliament on 21 March 2017, reignited
calls for a ‘public inquiry into the alleged failure of the
regulator at that time to protect public safety’ (Alton, 2017).
Previously, the Commission on Human Medicines (CHM),
a committee of the Medicines and Healthcare Products
Regulatory Agency (MHRA), had established an expert working
group (EWG) to forensically review the medical case for the
teratogenicity, or not, of HPTs. The EWG's final report,
published in November 2017, concluded that the scientific
evidence did ‘not support a causal association between the use
of HPTs, such as Primodos, during early pregnancy and adverse
outcomes’ (Commission on Human Medicines, 2017: 100).
However, it was explicitly ‘not within the remit of the
EWG tomake formal conclusions or recommendations on the
historical system or regulatory failures’ (Commission on
Human Medicines, 2017: 2), a situation that has left many
stakeholders dissatisfied (Gulland, 2017).
A main contention is that by 1967, when Gal published
against Primodos inNature, a convenient, widely available and
non-invasive alternative existed: urine tests for pregnancy.
Several countries were quick to take regulatory action
prohibiting the use of HPTs, and there is a sense that Britain
could have taken more decisive action sooner. Even if the
evidence against Primodos was weak or inconclusive, as many
experts believed, the availability of urine tests meant that
removing HPTs from the market would not have caused any
harm.2 Primodos was no life-extending cancer drug, for which1 Anomalies investigated in connection with HPTs include neural
tube defects, heart defects, limb defects, cleft palate and genital
abnormalities.
2 On the more general point that ‘weak evidence should be taken
into account when the costs of error [. . .] are potentially very high’
(Lewens, 2015: 160).it might be sensible from a regulatory perspective to accept
low or even high risks if they were sufficiently offset by the
benefits. Rather, as experts also agreed early on, it was a
redundant, unnecessary and possibly even harmful drug for
which a definitely harmless alternative existed. So why was it
allowed to remain on the British market for so many years?
Our aim in this article, which began at a conference in
Cambridge in January 2017, is to investigate the nationally
specific and even idiosyncratic factors that contributed to
the British Government's decision to leave Primodos and
other HPTs on the market. Placing the still open question of
teratogenicity to one side, we take a more contextual and
comparative approach than was possible under the auspices
of MHRA.3 Based on archival research in several countries, we
build a historical argument for apparent regulatory failure on
the part of CHM's predecessor organizations: the Committee
on Safety of Drugs (1963–1970) and the Committee on
the Safety of Medicines (1970–2005). We do so chiefly by
reconstructing the British timeline, and comparing this with
parallel developments in Norway and other countries that
followed a more precautionary line. We begin by reviewing
the history of pregnancy testing to clarify the chronology of
availability of more or less risky alternatives.Marketing pills as pregnancy tests
Today's home tests are ubiquitous retail objects that can
be purchased cheaply from any pharmacy, supermarket
or online. They are highly reliable from the day of a missed
period, and work by detecting the presence of human
chorionic gonadotrophin (hCG) in a woman's urine. However,
pregnancy testing was not always so easy. The Primodos
decades (1950s–1970s) saw three major and, to some
extent, overlapping regimes: bioassays (1929–1964), immu-
noassays (since 1962) and home tests (since 1971). These
corresponded to the mass adoption of new diagnostic
technologies, services and supply chains, as well as to
changing social arrangements between women, doctors and
pharmacists. To simplify a complicated story, pregnancy
testing began as a laboratory service under medical control
that was typically reserved for differential diagnosis in
‘pathological’ cases. From the mid 1960s, women increasingly
gained access to ‘social’ pregnancy testing, not as patients
but as consumers (Olszynko-Gryn, 2014b).
To go into slightly more detail, the Aschheim-Zondek
‘mouse’ test for early pregnancy, a German innovation, was
adopted in Britain in 1929 as the first reliable bioassay
for hCG (Olszynko-Gryn, 2014a). Each test involved injecting
several mice with a woman's urine, then killing and dissecting
the mice to observe the presence, or not, of characteristic
ovarian changes induced by the hormone. Mice (and rabbits)
were supplanted by reusable toads as diagnostic services
ramped up in the late 1940s under the new National Health
Service (NHS) (Gurdon and Hopwood, 2000). The Dutch
pharmaceutical company Organon launched Pregnosticon, the
first immunoassay, in 1962 and most laboratories abandoned
the use of animals shortly thereafter. Predictor, the first3 Recent experimental results implicate the components of Primodos
as ‘potentially teratogenic, depending on dose and embryonic stage of
development in the zebra fish’ (Brown et al., 2018: 1).
36 J Olszynko-Gryn et al.reliable home test, debuted in 1971. It resembled a small
chemistry set and was not an overnight commercial success.
Only after Unilever launched Clearblue One Step in 1988 did
a younger generation of women embrace self-testing as the
new normal (Olszynko-Gryn, 2017b).
Today, it may be difficult to believe that doctors ever
prescribed pills as pregnancy tests. However, attempts to
develop a ‘therapeutic’ or ‘clinical’ test for pregnancy that
acted on the patient herself and so did not depend on a
laboratory go back at least to the 1910s (Henriksen, 1941).
Invasive pregnancy tests included eye-drop tests as well as
skin reaction tests inspired by those for diphtheria, scarlet
fever and tuberculosis, as well as hay fever and other
allergies (Jackson, 2007; Smith, 2015). Other methods,
including the prostigmine test for early pregnancy, were
said to function as Primodos later would, namely, by
inducing menstrual bleeding in non-pregnant women alone
(Soskin et al., 1940). As with parallel attempts to develop a
simple colour-change reaction in a test tube, most invasive
tests prior to 1950 were deemed insufficiently accurate for
clinical application and were not widely adopted.
HPTs emerged as the result of research not on pregnancy
diagnosis, but on the treatment of amenorrhoea, a common
condition that was often associated with infertility, but
could also be caused by pregnancy. Bernhard Zondek, the
famous co-inventor of the celebrated mouse test, pioneered
the combined injection of synthetic oestrogen and proges-
terone in the treatment of amenorrhoea in Palestine in
the early 1940s (Novick, 2014). His article in the Journal of
the American Medical Association became a touchstone for
what became known as ‘Zondek's method’ of non-surgical
curettage (Zondek, 1942). After World War II, pharmaceu-
tical companies began marketing hormone treatments for
amenorrhoea, not directly to women but to their (then
almost always male) gynaecologists (Oudshoorn, 1994). New
forms of synthetic sex hormones enabled the crucial shift
from injections to better tolerated tablets in the late 1950s.
These significantly opened up the market and cleared the
way for oral contraceptives.
Primodos, as indicated by the German trade name
‘Duogynon’, innovatively combined Schering's two leading
gynaecological products: Proluton and Progynon. As such, it
contained the same mixture of synthetic sex hormones that
would later constitute Anovlar, Schering's commercially
successful oral contraceptive (Thoms, 2014).4 Schering,
an undisputed leader in hormone research and marketing
(Gaudillière, 2005), initially presented the new drug primarily
as a treatment for amenorrhoea. Advertisements in Schering's
in-house journal show that Duogynon's secondary function as a
test for early pregnancy began almost as an afterthought
in 1950, and then increased in prominence to become the
dominant indication a few years later. By 1960, Schering
promoted Duogynon/Primodos, now in tablet form, exclu-
sively for pregnancy testing. Other companies soon
followed suit with competing products, notably Roussel's
Amenorone Forte, but Schering continued to lead the
market in most countries. In contrast to the toad test,4 One tablet of Anovlar contained 4 mg norethisterone acetate, a
progestin, and 0.05 mg of ethinyloestradiol, an oestrogen (Marks,
2001: 77); one tablet of Primodos contained 5 mg norethisterone
acetate and 0.01 mg ethinyloestradiol (Brown et al., 2018).which was not considered effective until 2 weeks after a
missed period, HPTs were indicated for use on the first day
of amenorrhoea.
In postwar Britain, the rise of Primodos coincided with
a significant increase in demand for pregnancy testing.
One country doctor, for example, ordered pregnancy tests
for only 1.3% of his female patients in the late 1940s, a
proportion that had increased to 38.8% by the late 1970s
(Oakley, 1984: 230). Meanwhile, doctors' requests for all
types of laboratory investigations, including pregnancy
tests, doubled between 1961 and 1971, straining a public
health system that was facing a major financial crisis by the
mid 1970s (Olszynko-Gryn, 2017a). In the 1950s, however,
supply from laboratories seems to have plateaued; expan-
sion was constrained by overhead costs and infrastructure
requirements for animals, housing, technicians and general
maintenance (Olszynko-Gryn, 2014b: 146). As laboratories
failed to keep up with increasing demand, Schering and
other companies captured part of a lucrative and expanding
market.
Primodos and other HPTs were initially marketed as
plausibly advantageous over the toad test and, before the
thalidomide tragedy (1957–1961), neither consumers nor
experts were accustomed to associating prescription drugs
with risk of harm to the fetus (Clow, 2003). Thalidomide
may have raised concerns about the permeability of the
placental barrier (Martin and Holloway, 2014), but because
the pregnant body ordinarily produces high levels of sex
hormones, the comparably small dosages in HPTs were
widely regarded as harmless. Progesterone therapy was
widely used in the 1950s to prevent miscarriage, and many
doctors believed that HPTs, far from causing harm, would even
‘help implant the ovum properly’ (Anon., 1960). Marketing
literature reported that anxious patients found the physiolog-
ical certainty of uterine bleeding more reassuring than a
laboratory report, which could be mistaken (Squibb, 1962:
76–77). Primodos was, moreover, a test that the woman took
home to perform privately, the result known to her alone.
HPTs thus conferred some of the discretion that Predictor
and other self-testing kits later would.5
Some experts, however, expressed misgivings early on.
In 1956, London physiologist Hubert Britton, having received
‘with dismay’ a ‘brochure from a drug firm’ advertising the
use of synthetic sex hormones as pregnancy tests, voiced
concern in the British Medical Journal (BMJ) that such tests
could potentially ‘upset the delicate hormonal balance’ of
pregnancy and provoke miscarriage or even damage the
embryo at its ‘most susceptible’ stage of development
(Britton, 1956). Two years later, Birmingham geneticist
John Edwards wrote in the British Journal of Preventive and
Social Medicine that the ‘widely advertised’ HPTs could
provide ‘the type of insult which is likely to cause foetal
malformations, and would often be administered at a stage
in pregnancy when it might initiate malformations of the
central nervous system’ (Edwards, 1958: 128). In 1961, soon
after Schering's British marketing blitz, Woman magazine
warned against the unknown risks of HPTs and promoted the
toad, not the tablets, as a ‘modern scientific achievement’
(Seaward, 1961).5 Thanks to Isabel Davis (Birkbeck, University of London) for this
point.
37Historical argument for regulatory failureHospital doctors had access to in-house laboratories
and so did not generally prescribe HPTs, but many general
practitioners (GPs) embraced Primodos, especially if they
were overworked and had limited access to alternatives.
For instance, a pair of Bristol doctors, who provided
antenatal care to 7500 patients in 1960, regarded the
collection and transport of urine as a ‘considerable
inconvenience to an already busy person’. Instead of the
‘cumbersome’ and ‘lengthy’ toad test, they decided to give
Primodos to ‘all women’ who had amenorrhoea of short
duration, excluding those who were ‘clearly pregnant’
(Higgens and Sadler, 1960).
Organon's Pregnosticon put paid to the use of animals
in pregnancy diagnosis, and was perceived by Schering
researchers as a commercial threat to Duogynon (Ufer,
1962: 9). From 1965, small commercial laboratories in
London used Pregnosticon or one of the other immunoassays
already on the market to serve women not as ‘patients’ but
as ‘clients’. Most charged £2 for a pregnancy test, or the
equivalent of a week's rent for a student in Leeds in the late
1960s (Olszynko-Gryn, 2017a). Primodos cost only 5 shillings,
one-eighth the cost of a urine test. As prescription drugs,
HPTs were initially reimbursable on the NHS, and many
patients were sent home with free samples. The Ministry of
Health placed Pregnosticon on central supply to hospital
pathology departments in 1967 (Olszynko-Gryn, 2014a: 229),
but access to laboratory services was distributed unevenly
outside major cities so prescribing tablets was often cheaper
and quicker than ordering a urine test. Hence, geographic
variation in income levels and the uneven availability of
alternatives helps to explain why a Sunday Times survey
found that 10 of 12 doctors in South Wales still used HPTs in
1975 (Gillie, 1975).The early-warning system
Pharmaceutical companies faced few obstacles when
bringing drugs to market in the 1950s. The thalidomide
tragedy not only solidified the conception of the placental
barrier as dangerously permeable, but also transformed
teratology – the science of birth defects – into a much
sought-after specialism and motivated the extension of
national systems of pharmacovigilance to include the risk of
potentially teratogenic drugs (Al-Gailani, 2014; Dron, 2016;
Löwy, 2017; Reagan, 2010). In Britain, the tragedy
brought into public view a debate that was already quietly
underway in the corridors of power, but legislative reform
did not come into effect for another decade, with the
implementation of the 1968 Medicines Act in 1971
(Abraham, 2009).
The Medicines Division, a national drug regulatory agency
within the Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS),
was formed in 1971 to administer the Medicines Act. It
comprised of a full-time scientific staff to review industry-
furnished data on new drugs, and empowered to permit
(or deny) approval to those drugs for the British market.
The Act applied to new drugs alone; thousands of ‘old’
drugs, including Primodos, could continue to be used in
the NHS without further review. In 1975, in response to
a European Economic Community directive, the DHSS
established a committee to assess the safety and efficacyof old drugs, a task completed in 1990. In addition to public
safety and cost saving for the NHS, industry interests were,
from the start, an important concern of government
officials, who consulted closely with pharmaceutical com-
panies (Abraham, 2009).
In 1963, amidst the fallout from thalidomide, the
Government established the Committee on Safety of Drugs
(CSD), known colloquially as the ‘Dunlop Committee’ after
its first chair Sir Derrick Dunlop, a prominent Scottish
physician and pharmacologist. The CSD was tasked with
reviewing data submitted by pharmaceutical companies,
and with advising manufacturers and the Government on
whether new drugs had been adequately tested for market.
It had no legal powers and depended on voluntary cooper-
ation from industry. By the end of 1965, it consisted of a
small team of six doctors, three pharmacists and a modest
administrative staff. Its members were not employed by
pharmaceutical companies, but were permitted to have
financial interests, such as shareholdings or research grants.
The review process was confidential and thus protected
from public scrutiny. It was also designed to be rapid so as
not to needlessly delay or prevent the introduction of
potentially beneficial drugs (Abraham, 1995: 66–70; Tansey
and Reynolds, 1997: 103–132).
The CSD was divided into three subcommittees on
toxicity, clinical trials and adverse reactions, the latter of
which was first chaired by Oxford professor Leslie Witts.
Dr. William ‘Bill’ Inman joined the CSD as Senior Medical
Officer and Medical Assessor for the Witts Subcommittee
in 1964. Previously, he had battled polio as a medical
student at Cambridge before acting as Medical Adviser to
Imperial Chemical Industries, the company his father had
cofounded in 1926. He was later promoted to Principal
Medical Officer and is today remembered as the ‘father of
the mini-pill’ for his role in reducing the oestrogenic content
of oral contraception (Inman, 1999, 2006; Marks, 1999,
2002). Between 1967 and 1978, he was the government
advisor chiefly responsible for deciding what action, if any,
to take on HPTs.
Inman was also responsible for overseeing the ‘yellow
card’ early-warning system of monitoring adverse reactions,
so named for the distinctively coloured post-free business
reply cards issued periodically to GPs and hospital doctors
by the CSD. Doctors were encouraged to use the cards,
which were arriving at a rate of around 1000 every month
in 1964, to ‘report any suspected reaction to a new drug
and any serious reaction to any drug, however old or new it
was’ (Tansey and Reynolds, 1997: 118). The CSD did not
have access to a computer, and Inman's ‘statistical calcula-
tions were worked with a slide-rule or log-tables and a hand-
cranked “Facit” adding machine’ (Inman, 1999: 28). In the
absence of robust baseline data, Inman developed a compar-
ative method of assessing reactions caused by chemically
similar drugs (Inman, 1999: 29).
The first drug that came to Inman's attention was a
vasodilator that ‘quite obviously caused jaundice’. The
company, Inman later recalled, was ‘persuaded to remove
that voluntarily without any pressure. It was kept under
wraps. There wasn't much publicity. We didn't seek any
publicity’ (Tansey and Reynolds, 1997: 118). This was an
ideal outcome for Inman, who preferred to resolve any
potential safety issues quietly without involving doctors, the
7 On Eraldin, also known as practolol (Abraham and Davis, 2006).
On asthma deaths (Pearce, 1996, 2007). Practical problems (funding
38 J Olszynko-Gryn et al.media or the general public.6 Owen Wade, Deputy Chairman
of the Adverse Reactions Subcommittee in the mid 1960s,
lamented this policy, which was intended to protect
cooperative companies from bad press. Publicity, he later
argued, would have ‘shown doctors the value of reporting
adverse drug reactions and our reporting system would have
got off the ground much quicker than it did’ (Tansey and
Reynolds, 1997: 125). In reality, doctors voluntarily reported
only a small fraction of the suspected adverse reactions they
observed in clinical practice, perhaps only 10% for serious
reactions (Rawlins, 1995). The fraction was even smaller for
minor reactions and birth defects.
Inman later described the system's ‘inability to detect
teratogenic drug effects’ as one of ‘several fundamental
defects’ that had been ‘obvious’ from the start (Inman,
1999: 118). This is surprising for a system set up in response
to thalidomide, a teratogenic drug, but several factors
militated against detection. For one, gestation slowed
down the already imperfect process of voluntary reporting.
Noticing an adverse reaction 9 months after a drug had been
prescribed – and in another patient, the child, who had
not been given the drug directly – was a particular challenge
as women went to gynaecologists, but took their children
to paediatricians, and first-time mothers often moved
house and changed doctors. Finally, the CSD insisted on the
premarket testing of new drugs on pregnant animals, but
this did not affect Primodos, an ‘old drug’ that was already
on the market.
In 1970, the CSD was replaced by the Committee on the
Safety of Medicines (CSM), a creation of the 1968 Medicines
Act that set up a working party in 1976 to consider ways
of ameliorating the early-warning system. However, at
the same time, pressure was mounting to relax regulatory
control. After the 1973 oil crisis, the pharmaceutical industry's
export trade contributed even more significantly to the
British Government's balance of payments and to maintaining
the value of sterling abroad. When the Chancellor of the
Exchequer was forced to obtain a conditional loan from the
International Monetary Fund in 1976, the Government aligned
its priorities even more with ‘those set by industry’ (Abraham
and Davis, 2006: 141). Did the CSM eventually overcome the
inability of its predecessor to detect another thalidomide?
Inman did not think so. ‘Forty years after thalidomide’, he
later wrote in his memoirs, there had been ‘no appreciable
progress in the United Kingdom in the detection of drug-
induced birth defects’ (Inman, 1999: 106).
Pill scare and abortion panic
In 1965, when Isabel Gal began investigating spina bifida
in Surrey, she struck up a correspondence with Inman
that lasted many years. At the time, Inman privately agreed
with Gal that, in view of the availability of non-invasive
alternatives, HPTs were ‘not essential’ and it would ‘not
be a disaster if [her] paper had the effect of reducing the
frequency of their use’ (Inman, 1967a). However, he had
doubts about her methodology and, as he later recalled,
‘there was another aspect that had to be absolutely taboo’6 On the active production and maintenance of ignorance, including
by medical and scientific experts (Proctor and Schiebinger, 2008).(Inman, 1999: 117). Namely, HPTs were compositionally
similar to oral contraceptive pills, and Gal had implicated
these in her letter to Nature: ‘A thalidomide-type scare
in the media could easily cause panic among women using
oral contraceptives. What would happen, for example, if a
woman started taking the pill before she was aware that she
was already pregnant?’ (Inman, 1999: 117).
What did Inman mean by this? Was he implying that such
a woman would then want to have an abortion? Abortion
became legal in Britain, but not Northern Ireland, in April
1968, when the Abortion Act 1967 came into effect (Sheldon,
1997). Inman continued, ‘On the one hand we had Dr. Gal's
suspicion of a possible danger to the foetus and, on the
other hand, a very real danger that publicity might cause a
woman to stop using oral contraceptives or other prepara-
tions that were important in the treatment of a variety
of gynaecological disorders. I was advised not to discuss
these possibilities with anybody in case the idea that the
HPT problem might have much wider repercussions inadver-
tently slipped out, though I can hardly believe that many
people would not have thought of it themselves’ (Inman,
1999: 117).
Of Gal's report, a Schering executive claimed in an
interview in 1980 that to ‘cast doubt on a major method of
family planning, on this very slender evidence really, would
not only have been a major commercial disaster but a real
human disaster.. .we would have thrown panic into millions
of women worldwide’ (Wintour, 1981). Inman later claimed
that the ‘complexity of the situation made it very difficult
for the Committee to undertake any action that would
stop their use as a pregnancy test without compromising
their other important uses’ (Inman, 1999: 118). However,
was he more worried about preventing another thalidomide
disaster or about preventing a thalidomide-type scare in the
media?
Inman later claimed that, had Gal's study been more
convincing, the CSD would have banned HPTs ‘immediately’
(Inman, 1999: 120). However, instead of taking immediate
action, he launched a pilot study on drug-induced birth
defects in collaboration with the medical division of the
Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, a forerunner of
the Office for National Statistics. The idea was to generate
more robust epidemiological evidence for or against terato-
genicity. As he later admitted, however, it took years to
‘assemble sufficiently large groups of children with each
type of abnormality to allow valid conclusions to be drawn’,
and progress was ‘lamentably slow, largely because higher
priority had been given to concurrent problems with oral
contraceptives, asthma deaths, the Eraldin disaster and the
lack of equipment and staff’ (Inman, 1999: 119).7
Of the three concurrent drug problems, the one concerning
oral contraceptives is the most proximate and instructive
here; it had a direct bearing on Inman's decision-making
process in the case of HPTs. Just before Christmas 1969, news
broke that the pill was suspected of causing potentially fatalconstraints, coordination, sufficient population samples) have
been regarded as difficult to overcome, even decades after the
establishment of birth defect monitoring systems such as EUROCAT
(Dolk, 2005).
39Historical argument for regulatory failureblood clots in otherwise healthy, young women. Such concerns
are nearly as old as oral contraception itself, but came to a
head in Britain only when the CSD held what was supposed to
be a confidential briefing with pharmaceutical companies to
privately disclose Inman's unconfirmed suspicions regarding
the oestrogenic component of the pill. As with the vasodilator
that caused jaundice, Inman would have preferred to work
closely with industry and to exclude doctors, patients and the
press. This time, however, the news leaked within hours.
First the Daily Express, a conservative mid-market
broadsheet that had come out in favour of abortion law
reform (Bingham, 2009: 88), then other newspapers and
television programmes reported on the possible risk (Tansey
and Reynolds, 1997: 121). Media exposure forced the
CSD to hurriedly issue a yellow warning, its ninth, but the
damage had already been done. Dozens of aggrieved GPs
complained in the BMJ that the Committee's ‘maladroit’ and
‘unpardonable discourtesy’ had revealed the Government's
‘apparent contempt’ for doctors, some of whom had first
learned of Inman's concerns from ‘agitated’ patients (Anon.,
1969b). A lead article in the BMJ criticized the CSD for
withholding the ‘statistical and clinical basis for its advice’
and went on to underscore the ‘lesson’ at hand, namely,
‘that official committees set up to inform the medical
profession should communicate their information simply
and solely to the profession. Where matters of life and death
are concerned, as they are with the ‘pill’ and have been
in several of the committee's previous reports, a press
conference is an entirely inappropriate means of expression
of the committee's views. The committee was not set up to
educate – let alone alarm – the public’ (Anon., 1969a).
Inman's bruising experience with the pill, not to mention
the then pervasive culture of medical paternalism that
generally kept women in the dark about risky hormones and
other gendered medical interventions (Tuana, 2006), helps
to explain his reluctance to publicize concerns about HPTs.
When the CSD finally issued a yellow warning in 1975, it
was only after the Sunday Times – the same paper that
campaigned on behalf of thalidomide victims – intervened
(Gillie, 1975). Inman responded to the Sunday Times report
by drawing a direct comparison in the Guardian between the
‘100,000 unwanted babies’ allegedly caused by the press
leak in 1969 and the ‘very real danger’ that women would
now be ‘pestering their doctors for an abortion’ (Pallister,
1975). The headline, ‘Doctor says drugs publicity could start
abortion panic’, made explicit what had been taboo only a
few years earlier.
HPTs, however, remained on the market for the treat-
ment of menstrual disorders, and doctors continued to use
them as pregnancy tests. From peak use by an estimated
100,000 women in 1971, prescriptions by one reckoning
fell to around 40,000 in 1975, 25,000 in 1976 and 6000 in
1977 (Gillie, 1978).8 Schering added a red label to Primodos
contraindicating pregnancy, but doctors did not see the
packaging; they just wrote prescriptions (Anon., 1977b).
Some pharmacists were uncomfortable dispensing Primodos
but did so anyway, under the assumption that products
presenting a similar risk to thalidomide had ‘automatically
beenwithdrawn’ (Leddy, 2017). The British Pregnancy Advisory8 For a discussion of the available quantitative data, see Commission
on Human Medicines (2017: 17–19).Service condemned the continued use of HPTs in February
1978 as an ‘area of persistent malpractice which represents
an easily avoidable hazard’ (Brewer, 1978), and the Sunday
Times was able to obtain the drug ‘on prescription’ in April,
months after it was voluntarily taken off the British market
by Schering for ‘commercial reasons’ (Gillie, 1978). By then,
Jack Ashley, the Labour MP and deaf campaigner for disabled
people who had cut his teeth on thalidomide, was calling for a
public inquiry (Anon., 1977a).9The control mothers
By April 1975, when Inman reported some preliminary results
to the BMJ, he and his colleagues had retrospectively
examined only 149 abnormal pregnancies and the same
number of normal controls: Primodos and related products
‘had been used by twenty-three mothers of abnormal babies
compared with only eight of the controls’ (Greenberg et al.,
1975). This finding, they contended, ‘tended to support’
Gal's conclusion, but Inman continued to suspect that the
‘reason for doing the test, such as the previous birth of an
abnormal baby, would eventually prove to be the important
factor and not the test itself. A woman who had already born
an abnormal child was much more likely to bear another
one’ (Inman, 1999: 119).
Inman had hoped to include at least 2000 cases and
the same number of controls in his study every year, but
underfunding and understaffing limited it to no more than
836 babies and the same number of controls, collected over
several years. In the end, he concluded that underlying
factors, not Primodos, were to blame: ‘As we had suspected,
four times as many mothers of abnormal children than
“control” mothers had a family history of previous abnor-
malities or had themselves borne abnormal children in
the past. This was more than enough to account for the
small excess of HPT use we had noted in our earlier report’
(Inman, 1999: 120).
But who did Inman imagine the control mothers to be?
Were they women who had no pregnancy test whatsoever,
or were they women whose urine had been tested? By the
1970s, pregnancy testing was increasingly the norm, and all
kinds of women went to their GPs with a missed period
(Olszynko-Gryn, 2017a). We know that some doctors pre-
ferred to order a urine test, while others sent their patient
home with tablets. But what do we know about the women?
First-hand accounts suggest that patients given HPTs
were similar to patients who had urine tests (several had
both), and that many were first-time mothers with no prior
history of pregnancy problems or malformed children. One
such woman was 20 years old and living in the Midlands
when she became pregnant in 1970. Her periods had ‘always
been regular’ and she was ‘so excited’ at the prospect of
pregnancy. She went ‘blindly’ to the GP who ‘prescribed two
tablets, Primodos, to be taken over the two days and said it
would cause a bleed if I wasn't pregnant’. She was, as she
later recalled, ‘young, the first of all [her] friends to be
pregnant and didn't even question it.. .’ (Collings, 2017).9 On Ashley's life and career (Ashley, 1973, 1992). Ashley was also
a key player in concurrent campaigns for vaccine-damaged children
(Millward, 2017).
10 On the construction of smoking during pregnancy as a public
health concern and social problem in the 1970s (Oaks, 2001).
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and ‘so went to [the] GP for confirmation’: ‘She gave me
two pills to take, one to take straight away and the other
12 hours later. The pills were Primodos, and I distinctly
remember asking the doctor that, if I was pregnant, would
the pills hurt the baby at all as I said I would not take them
if there was any chance that they could, but she reassured
me that no harm would come to the baby. My period did
not start so a week or so later she sent me to the hospital for
the routine urine test which obviously confirmed that I was
pregnant’ (Mills, 2017). The evidence is anecdotal, but it
accords with what we know about the GPs who prescribed
HPTs, namely, that they initially perceived the drugs chiefly
as a convenient alternative to the laborious toad test, and
later continued to use them out of habit.
Back in 1967, Gal's preliminary report had presented
Inman with a ‘rather awkward problem’. On the one hand,
he was not convinced of the validity of the data ‘on the
grounds that the selection of cases was wrong’. On the
other hand, he was not prepared to ‘rule out the possibility
altogether’ (Inman, 1967b). He imagined getting to the
bottom of things with a ‘prospective study of the outcome of
pregnancy of matched pairs of women obtained from the
same catchment area, one of each pair having had hormonal
and the other biological pregnancy tests’. This would have
involved a large number of doctors, and the decision on
which test to apply would have been made randomly.
However, the CSD lacked ‘facilities for further investigation’
and no such study was ever launched. Instead, Inman merely
hoped that the manufacturers – ‘in view of the unreliability
of hormonal pregnancy tests and of doubts about their
safety, and of the dubious profitability of these products’ –
would voluntarily ‘cease to promote them when and if the
Gal paper is finally published’ (Inman, 1968).
In 1975, Inman conceded that the CSM was ‘defenceless
in the matter of the eight-year delay’ between Gal's report
and the first yellow warning that followed the publication of
preliminary results in the BMJ and the Sunday Times exposé
(Inman, 1975). Two years later, when the completed study
was published, he and his co-authors presented the final
results as ‘consistent with a general teratogenic effect of
HPT’. The observed difference between case and control use
of HPTs remained significant even when all ‘case mothers’
with a personal or family history of congenital malformation
were removed from the analysis. The report, which was
also published in the BMJ, agreed with the international
consensus that had formed: ‘The excess use of HPT by case
mothers found by us was not great and the association with
malformations nonspecific; alternative risk-free methods of
pregnancy diagnosis are, however, available and the use of
HPTs is unnecessary’ (Greenberg et al., 1977).
Some 20 years later, however, Inman felt vindicated that
the statistical correlation between the use of HPTs and
malformations could be explained in terms of underlying
factors. Standing by the policy of inaction that had prevailed
in the 1970s, he wrote in his memoirs: ‘It is the coward's
way out to take action and perhaps bask in the reflected
glory of the newspapers for doing something positive against
a drug. It takes more courage to exercise restraint, and I
vigorously defend my colleagues and former colleagues
on the Committee and in the Department of Health in
taking no action at that stage’ (Inman, 1999: 124). What hadchanged? The answer, in part, lies in a German study that
played a crucial role in blocking Jack Ashley's call for a public
inquiry.The German study
On 26 May 1978, Jack Ashley and Labour Health Minister
Roland Moyle debated the need for an independent public
inquiry into Primodos in the House of Commons. Ashley
contended that in view of Gal's original warning in 1967
and of the ‘gravity of severe congenital abnormality’, HPTs
should have been ‘immediately suspended pending full
clearance by the committee’. This should have been
‘axiomatic and automatic, especially after our experience of
the thalidomide tragedy. Instead, hesitancy was compounded
by incompetence and, as a result, more than 1,500,000
pregnant women were placed at unnecessary risk by being
given these drugs and thousands of children may have been
gravely damaged’. Ashley sought an inquiry to ‘establish why
the Government failed’ and pressed Moyle on whether he
accepted that studies ‘conclusively prove that HPT drugs
sometimes – not necessarily always – cause abnormalities.
Does he confirm or deny that?’ (Ashley, 1978).
‘Until today’, Moyle claimed, his answer ‘might have
been “Yes”’. However, on the morning of the debate, he
had acquired ‘some evidence of testing in this field by the
German Research [Foundation]’. Planned in response to
thalidomide and carried out in 21 hospitals in West Germany
from 1964 to 1974 (Michaelis et al., 1983), this prospective
study was, according to Moyle, ‘the most comprehensive
investigation ever conducted’ on the suspected teratogenic
effects of drugs administered in early pregnancy; it ‘covered
nearly 15,000 women, and nearly 8,000 of the tests on those
women have been evaluated in the preliminary report’. The
results, Moyle continued, did ‘not provide evidence that
hormonal pregnancy tests were harmful. The study shows
that many other factors can influence the outcome of
pregnancy. For example, women with abnormal babies had
had, according to the study, more previous miscarriages,
had had more abnormal children and had suffered more
frequently from chronic diseases of various kinds. Cigarette
smoking was shown to have an unfavourable effect’ (Moyle,
1978b).10
The German study, Moyle argued, revealed that ‘anxious’
women with a history of miscarriage ‘tended to make
greater use’ of HPTs and that this supported the ‘view that
the results of the committee's studies on hormonal preg-
nancy tests may have been due to some other unidentified
confusing factor, most likely relating to the reason that
the pregnancy test was used’. As for the parents seeking
compensation, they would have to ‘get medical research
done’ to provide a ‘causal connection between the applica-
tion of these tests and the damage that was caused’, and that
connection did ‘not exist at present’ (Moyle, 1978b).
Causality is notoriously difficult to establish (John, 2010),
and Moyle did not elaborate on how the parents were
supposed to finance or otherwise support the medical
research. When asked on ITV's ‘The London Programme’
41Historical argument for regulatory failurewhether, given that harmless alternatives existed, it would
‘not have been perhaps wiser for the [CSM] back in the
late 1960s to have taken some action’, he impatiently
responded, ‘Well that's all very much water under the
bridge. Within 1971 they were still on the market when
the Medicines Act became law and of course if [.. .] the
Department were to withdraw something from the market
at that stage they had to show that it was positively
dangerous or unhelpful or something of that sort and of
course they didn't have the evidence to do that, so they
couldn't’ (Moyle, 1978a).
For journalist Greg Dyke, who produced the programme,
it was ‘clear’ that Moyle's ‘advisers in the Department
of Health’, particularly those involved with the CSM, were
‘strongly opposed to any form of independent public inquiry’
(Dyke, 1978). Inman later claimed that he ‘could not
understand the arguments against such an enquiry other
than the cost to the taxpayer’ (Inman, 1999: 121). However,
at the time, it was he who furnished Moyle with the German
study.
The German study was Moyle's trump card. However, the
findings that Inman had fed Moyle in advance of the debate
were only preliminary. When the final report was published
in 1983, the results were less conclusive than Moyle had
made them out to be in 1978. Singling out Duogynon
(Primodos) as particularly troublesome, the German team
concluded: ‘The interpretation of the Duogynon analysis
seems to us less evident than for the antiemetic drugs
[to treat morning sickness] and Proluton [mainly to prevent
miscarriage]. Although we did not find a significant associ-
ation, the observed odds ratios were greater than 1, and
their upper confidence limits were rather high, which could
be regarded as being in accordance with the positive findings
of other studies. The lack of significance could then be
interpreted as due to the small number of observations. We
therefore consider it as adequate that general consensus was
obtained not to use Duogynon during pregnancies’ (Michaelis
et al., 1983: 64).11
This is not a smoking gun that Duogynon/Primodos
definitely caused birth defects. However, it falls well short
of establishing harmlessness. If anything, it tended to support,
not undermine, the ‘positive findings’ that came before.Norway and other countries
Duogynon was finally taken off the German market in
1981. However, renamed ‘Cumorit’, it continued to be
used informally as an abortifacient in developing countries
(Bonnema and Dalebout, 1992; Ujah, 1991). The final report
of the CHM's EWG notes that in ‘different European countries
and globally, decisions to withdraw HPT products were
taken in a staggered and uncoordinated way’. It goes on to
explain this in terms of the complexity of the market,
‘differences of opinion on the strength of the evidence
for an association between HPTs and congenital anomalies’,
and the lack of well-developed ‘communication channels
between regulators in different countries’ (Commission on
Human Medicines, 2017: 92). In this section, we briefly11 Commonly used in case–control studies, odds ratios measure
associations between exposures and outcomes (Szumila, 2010).survey the warnings that led to a ban in some countries
earlier than in others. In addition to the factors noted by the
EWG, we explain the decision to take action in Norway and
other countries in terms of the international consensus that,
in light of a non-invasive alternative, HPTs were unnecessary
and so could be taken off the market without harming
patients. We also find that Inman's preoccupation with
protecting the market for oral contraception and preventing
an abortion panic was not widely shared outside Britain.
Norway, which established one of the first drug regula-
tory systems in 1928, provides the most striking and
instructive contrast. In line with the sociodemocratic
principles of the Norwegian welfare state, pharmaceutical
products were judged more on the basis of expert evaluation
than on commercial potential (Pedersen and Lie, 2013).
Between 1938 and 1994, when Norway joined the European
Economic Area, its drug policy was based not only on safety,
efficacy and cost, but also on medical need. The country's
Medical Need Clause (MNC) required any new drug to meet a
clear-cut therapeutic need and to represent an improve-
ment over alternatives already on the market. Put into
action, the MNC effectively restricted the number of drugs
on the Norwegian market in the 1970s to around 2000, which
was far fewer than the number in most other European
countries (7000–25,000). Finally, the Norwegian Medicines
Agency (NoMA) subjected all new drugs to a probationary
approval period of 5 years followed by a re-assessment
process that could result in de-authorization (Brooks and
Geyer, 2016).
As apparently non-essential products for which harmless
alternatives existed, HPTs were in a comparatively vulner-
able position when Bergen gynaecologist Per Bergsjø wrote
against them in the Journal of the Norwegian Medical
Association in July 1968: ‘The consequence of [Gal's letter in
Nature] must be that we abandon the so-called HPTs. Even
though there are some doubts around the validity of the
findings, the fact that this diagnostic method is so uncertain
is in itself a reason for not using it. Today there are more
direct and completely harmless methods for diagnosing
pregnancy’ (Bergsjø, 1968; translation by E. Bjørvik).
NoMA's Specialist Control Board supported Bergsjø's
recommendation. Echoing the wording of Bergsjø's letter,
the Board notified Schering's Norwegian distributor of their
decision in February 1970: ‘Today there are more direct and
completely harmless diagnostic methods to diagnose preg-
nancy. The subject has been discussed in a meeting in the
Specialist Control Board, which decided that the indication
‘pregnancy test’ hereafter shall not be approved for hormone-
based drugs’ (Wold, 1970; translation by E. Bjørvik).
A Norwegian study linking HPTs to hypospadias, a
congenital malformation of the penis, added urgency to
the decision. Bergen paediatrician Dagfinn Aarskog wrote to
NoMA and argued in Acta Paediatrica Scandinavica in June
1970 that even ‘circumstantial evidence [.. .] should exhort
to caution in giving such drugs to pregnant women. [.. .]
With the simple laboratory methods now at hand to test for
pregnancy, there is no need for these potent steroids to be
used for this purpose’ (Aarskog, 1970: 35). NoMA cancelled
the indication of ‘pregnancy testing’ in September 1970 and,
by August 1972, the entry in the Norwegian pharmaceutical
industry's drug catalogue explicitly warned against the use
of Primodos in pregnancy on the grounds that it could cause
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for the treatment of amenorrhoea until 1973, when NoMA
reclassified the drug as ‘not medically justified’ and it
was taken off the market with compliance from Schering
(Barfods Farmaceutiske, 1973).
In Finland, Primodos tablets were discontinued when
the initial 5-year licence came up for renewal in 1971 and
was rejected. Injections remained available for use in the
treatment of amenorrhoea until 1978, when they were taken
off the market by the distributor (Weßel, 2018). Following
the independent corroboration of Aarskog's findings by
research at the Karolinska Institute in Stockholm, the
Swedish Medical Board removed the indication of ‘pregnancy
testing’ from the entry for Primodos in Sweden's national
drug registry in 1972, although Primodos and Duogynon
continued to be used in Sweden for the treatment of
amenorrhoea until 1975 and 1978, respectively. In France,
where pregnancy testing was linked to illegal abortion until
the law changed in 1975 (Cahen, forthcoming), products
such as Primodos were viewed with suspicion and were not
authorized for use as HPTs. Lack of authorization, however,
did not prevent their off-label use in pregnancy testing until
the mid 1970s, and some brands persisted on the market as
treatments for amenorrhoea until more recently.
Australia, New Zealand and the USA all took action in
1975. The Australian Government took action immediately
after William Brogan, a paediatrician investigating cleft
palate in Western Australia, warned against HPTs in the
Medical Journal of Australia in January 1975 (Brogan, 1975;
van den Heuvel, 1975). New Zealand took the additional
step of recalling stock from pharmacy shelves (Medsafe,
2017). In the USA, where HPTs were used informally as
‘morning-after’ contraceptives (Anon., 1967), the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) banned them at around the
same time (Kazmierski, 1976: 4–5). In contrast to Britain,
the regulators in these countries do not appear to have been
concerned about a pill scare or abortion panic. On the contrary,
the FDA's strongly worded ‘warning on use of sex hormones
in pregnancy’, which also covered diethylstilboestrol (DES),12
explicitly stated: ‘if pregnancy is suspected in a patient
receiving oral contraceptives, these should be discontinued
immediately. Obviously, every effort should be made to assure
that a woman is not pregnant before prescribing sex hormones
for any purpose.’ As for HPTs, the FDA's Ob-Gyn Advisory
Committee ‘concluded that the risk of teratogenicity also
precludes use of those hormones as a diagnostic test for
pregnancy’ (Anon., 1975: 4).Towards closure?
On 21 February 2018, the British Prime Minister Theresa
May ordered another review of HPTs, this time alongside
vaginal mesh implants, a treatment for incontinence linked
to chronic pain, and sodium valproate, an epilepsy drug
known to cause birth defects (a risk about which pregnant12 The oestrogen analogue DES was used for decades to prevent
miscarriage, and was used in the 1960s as a ‘morning-after’ pill until
research linked it to a rare form of vaginal cancer in girls who
had been exposed in utero. For a recent historical analysis, see
Gaudillière (2014).women were inadequately informed). Led by Baroness Julia
Cumberlege, it will ask whether there needs to be a ‘public
inquiry [.. .] into any of the cases’ (Triggle, 2018), all three
of which involve gendered medical interventions specifically
affecting women and government responses that have left
campaigners aggrieved. ACDHPT, meanwhile, is calling for
a full judicial or independent review of all the evidence,
including archival records that they (and Sky News) believe
point to a cover up.
Such a review is warranted, we believe, not least because
the regulatory process in Britain was clearly influenced by
nationally specific and even idiosyncratic factors that
were quite independent of the old scientific data examined
by the EWG. Inman, for example, prioritized averting a
thalidomide-type pill scare at a time when oral contracep-
tion was an economically important drug, the highly
publicized risk of thrombosis was threatening an abortion
panic, and medical paternalism generally militated against
informed consent. In contrast to Britain, regulators in
Norway and other countries took a more precautionary line
starting in 1971, even though they were working with a
similarly anecdotal or inconclusive evidence base. By 1975,
an international consensus had formed that HPTs were
redundant because of the widespread availability of non-
invasive alternatives (urine tests). Medical advisors in other
countries were seemingly unconcerned that taking HPTs
off the market would cause a pill scare, abortion panic or
‘human disaster’. The alarms sounded by Isabel Gal and by
her Norwegian, Swedish and Australian counterparts were
heeded by governments around the world.
This article has just scratched the surface of a much bigger
and even more international story about HPTs, sex hormones,
and the contested use and regulation of drugs in pregnancy. In
the absence of fine-grained data, there is much that will
necessarily remain obscure, but an independent review of all
the available evidence could significantly extend the analysis
we have presented here. A more comparative perspective than
was achieved by the CHM's EWG could further contextualize the
British regulatory process in relation to parallel developments
in other countries where medical advisors and governments
took divergent lines based on similar knowledge. A fuller
account, not limited to the scientific case for or against
teratogenicity, would have the potential not only to bring a
form of closure to the families who believe that they were
affected by HPTs, but also to shed light on pressing issues
of more general significance regarding risk, regulation and
communication between policy makers, medical experts and
patients. MHRAwould havemuch to learn from such an account
about how the regulatory process worked – or failed to work –
in the past, and about how it can be improved in the future.
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